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Discussant's Response to 
What Are the Courts Saying to Auditors? 
Russell A. Taussig 
University of Hawaii 
Mr. Sommer, in his excellent paper, clearly and forcefully tells us that the 
courts are saying to the auditors: "the ante has been raised in the auditing game." 
Whatever else the cases he cites imply, they indicate business will be good 
for attorneys in the liability area throughout the 1970's. In my opinion, these 
cases also will result, as with McKesson-Robbins, in an extension of auditing 
standards and an improvement in financial reporting. 
Mr. Sommer summarizes the significant characteristics of the recent cases 
under three major headings. 
1. The courts are making it much easier to sue the auditors. 
2. The courts are asking auditors to establish generally accepted account-
ing principles; but where those principles are lacking, the courts are 
filling the voids. 
3. The courts are holding the profession to its announced standards, 
but where the profession has been overly restrictive in defining such 
standards the courts are interpreting them quite broadly. 
Let us consider these three characteristics concretely in terms of another 
case, that has yet to go to trial, that of National Student Marketing. 
A civil action filed February 3, 1972 by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission against National Student Marketing Corporation, its auditors and two 
law firms in U.S. District Court (Washington, D.C.) asks for injunctive and other 
relief.1 At this early stage, all we have is a complaint. The actual facts, as sub-
stantiated by the evidence and decided on by the courts, may differ from the 
allegations. Nonetheless, the legal concepts and accounting issues are of such 
immediate significance that they are worthy of discussion at this time. Let us, 
therefore, review the allegations of the SEC, bearing in mind the possibility of 
revisions before final judgment is in. 
The SEC charges the defendants with fraud and deceit. If the SEC prevails, 
this case will expand the potential liabilities of independent accountants under 
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act for audited financial statements. 
It also will enlarge the responsibilities of auditors for comfort letters beyond 
those delineated in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 48. Consistent with its 
contemporary activist policy, the SEC seeks injunctive relief not only against the 
registrant but also against others, including Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Allegations by Securities and Exchange Commission 
The complaint against the auditors contains basically two charges: 
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1) Deficiencies in the financial statements prepared between 1968 and 
1970; 
2) failure to report the contents of a 1969 comfort letter to the SEC. 
The Story of National Student Marketing. National Student Marketing 
Corporation grew in two years from $723,000 of sales to $67.9 million. Cortes 
Randell, the founder and chief executive, captured the imagination of financial 
analysts and institutional investors with merchandising schemes ranging from 
computer-matched dating to half-fare cards for American Airlines. Wall Street 
wanted to believe in Cortes Randell, in view of the $45 billion annual disposable 
income of the youth market. 
NSM was bought out at $6 in April 1968 and soared to a high of $144 by 
December 15, 1969—an increase of 2,300 per cent. The decline was equally 
dramatic. On February 1, 1972 NSM was selling at $9—an aggregate loss of 
over $450 million. 
To what extent were these losses due to the cupidity of the investors? To 
what extent, if any, should the auditors absorb the losses? For an understanding 
of these questions, let us examine the SEC allegations in further detail. 
Accounting for Unbilled Contracts. In the first place, the SEC asserts the 
1968-69 financial statements were in error because contracts in progress were 
improperly recorded as receivables. For example, the SEC claims the balance 
sheet at August 31, 1968 overstated assets approximately $1.7 million by the im-
proper recording of unbilled accounts receivable, and pre-tax earnings for 1968 
were overstated approximately $696,000 out of a total of $699,000. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the 1968 statements, management wrote-off 
unbilled accounts receivable of approximately $1,000,000. Cortes Randell stated 
the change was to put the company on a more conservative basis of accounting. 
However, the SEC claims that the write-off was in recognition of the fact that 
these unbilled receivables never existed or were otherwise uncollectible. More-
over, the SEC claims these changes were not adequately disclosed in the 1969 state-
ments. The SEC also charges similar misstatements in the 1969 financial state-
ments. We must await the answers of the defendants, and testimony of witnesses, 
to appraise the validity of these charges and to judge whether the financial state-
ments were, in fact, erroneously prepared, or, simply were prepared according to 
the best evidence available at the time—later to be found wanting on the dis-
covery of subsequent events. 
Accounting for Sale of Subsidiaries. A second claim of the SEC concerns 
1969 gains from the disposition of two wholly owned subsidiaries. It is claimed 
the sales not only were not at arm's-length, but also were initiated after 1969 and 
dated back to inflate the profits for that year. Moreover, Cortes Randell trans-
ferred some of his own NSMC stock to the purchasers, which they then used as 
collateral for the acquisitions. The SEC charges PMM failed to conduct its ex-
amination in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards once it knew 
of Randell's involvement in these transactions. As in Continental Vending, dis-
cussed by Mr. Sommer, we find auditing questions arising from the stock transac-
tions of the holder of a controlling interest. Should the auditor expand the scope 
of his engagement when he discovers transactions that indicate a potential con-
flict of interest? 
The Comfort Letter, the Auditor, and the Public. In addition to the fore-
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going allegations relating to the audited financial statements, the SEC is also 
bringing charges regarding a comfort letter requested by counsel in connection 
with the merger of NSM and Interstate National Corporation on October 31, 1969. 
As a result of facts discovered during its regular annual examination for the 
year ended August 31, 1969, the auditors could not render a clean letter. They 
proposed the amortization of $500,000 of deferred costs against the nine months 
ended May 31, 1969, and they suggested the write-off of receivables and recording 
of other charges totalling approximately $300,000. PMM recommended that 
NSM should consider submitting corrected data prior to proceeding with the 
closing. (This information was conveyed orally; the written letter was not de-
livered at this time.) Interim statements were not revised. Stockholders were 
not informed. Nevertheless, the merger took place. 
The SEC charges the auditors failed in accordance with their professional 
obligation to insist that the NSMC financial statements be revised in accordance 
with the comfort letter, and failing that, to withdraw from the engagement. The 
SEC moreover, claims that the auditors had a duty to come forward and notify 
the SEC or the shareholders as to the materially misleading nature of the unau-
dited financial statements. Here, as in BarChris, discussed by Mr. Sommer, the 
SEC is attempting to expand the scope of the auditors' attest function in connec-
tion with comfort letters. 
Relief Sought by the SEC. The SEC in this civil action is asking basically 
for two things: 
1) a permanent injunction restraining defendants from future viola-
tions of federal securities laws; and 
2) a mandatory injunction requiring NSM to revise the 10-Ks filed be-
tween 1968 and 1970. 
Any other lawsuit—possibly a class action for money damages—would, of 
course, necessarily have to establish its case independently of the current one. 
However, it would seem the discovery of evidence for such an action would be 
facilitated somewhat by the present case. 
What then Are the Courts Saying to Auditors? 
This case reiterates three important issues for accountants outlined by Mr. 
Sommer in his thoughtful and well balanced paper: 
1) The SEC is escalating its activist role. National Student Marketing 
is the first major case against accountants (and others) where a 
business failure has not taken place. 
2) The SEC is raising once again a possible expansion of the overriding 
ethical concept of "fairness." 
3) The SEC's actions, if sustained, will greatly expand the responsibility 
of the auditor for unaudited financial statements. 
The Activist Role of the SEC. We have seen in BarChris, Yale Express, and 
Continental Vending a new activist role for the courts—emerging after some 35 
years of experience with the federal securities laws. SEC v. NSMC signals an-
other stage in that activist role. This is the first major civil case brought by the 
Commission against a registrant, its accountants, and attorneys for alleged de-
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ficiencies in financial statements arising out of a situation other than a business 
failure. It no doubt will not be the last. At least, criminal action was not as-
serted, as in Continental Vending. But what is the next logical step in the SEC's 
policing of financial information under the federal securities laws? Will the 
SEC seek to audit the auditors? 
In Yale Express, BarChris, Westec and Continental Vending, claims against 
the accountants arose in connection with business failure. In National Student 
Marketing, no such calamity triggered SEC action. Perhaps the next step would 
be for the SEC to evaluate the quality of auditing on all financials covered by 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Suppose the SEC, under its broad regulatory powers, 
would attempt to review auditors' working papers—at least on a sampling basis? 
In my opinion the added cost of such a review of auditors' working papers by the 
government would not be justified in terms of additional and more reliable 
financial information for investors. However, it seems clear that the already 
thorough and generally excellent intra-firm review function that exists in all 
major accounting firms must be greatly expanded in the light of the new activist 
role of the SEC. The reviewing partner will want to look beyond the audit 
program. He will want to ask himself at the end of every engagement: "Would 
I invest my money in this company?" If his question raises doubts, he should 
proceed on the assumption that he might be called into court to justify each 
financial statement item. The reviewing partner should also ask himself as an 
investor, "What additional information (by footnote or otherwise) would I like to 
have?" This means the courts are saying to the auditors: increase the scope of 
your engagements; increase your manpower; increase your fees. 
The Primacy of Fairness Over Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
Not only are courts saying to the auditors "expand the scope of your activities," 
they are also making promulgations about "fairness" in financial reporting, a 
concept which judges and lay juries are construing to take precedence over gen-
erally accepted accounting principles. 
In Continental Vending, for example, Judge Friendly stated: "the critical 
test is not whether the statements were prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, but whether they fairly present financial informa-
tion such that they contain no misstatements of fact, or, at least, no misstatements 
of facts known to the auditor." As Mr. Sommer comments in his paper: "the 
notion of the primacy of fairness over generally accepted accounting principles 
is less than unanimously acceptable to accountants." The concept of "fairness" 
is not operational. Fairness, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. To 
substitute it for generally accepted accounting principles would expose auditors 
to substantially greater hazards without proof that such a change would create 
a more liquid capital market. 
The SEC is attempting to hold the defendants in NSM to the primacy of 
"fairness." The SEC charges PMM with misleading financial statements because: 
1) the statements did not fairly present the facts; and additionally 
2) the statements were not prepared in conformity with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. 
Why two separate complaints? Apparently, the SEC will try to establish both 
charges, but will be satisfied if it sustains one. 
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Action for Standard Beyond that Established by the Auditing Profession. 
Not only is the SEC apparently seeking to hold accountants for the primacy of 
fairness, but it also is attempting to require a standard of auditing beyond that 
required by the profession. At least, so it would appear from the comments of 
Victor M. Earle III, general counsel of PMM. The SEC charges the auditors 
should have insisted that NSM revise the financial statements in accordance with 
the comfort letter, and failing that should have withdrawn from the engagement 
and notified the SEC or the shareholders of the two companies. Victor Earle re-
plied: "The plain implication of SAP 41 is that client confidences and state law 
and Rule 1.03 of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics can be breached, if at all, 
only where the auditor has subsequently acquired information affecting his pre-
viously issued expression of opinion on audited financial statements. 
"Here, the information acquired related to the company's previously issued 
unaudited financial statements as to which the firm had not expressed an 
opinion."2 
While SAP 41 applies only to events discovered by an auditor subsequent to 
the issuance of an opinion on audited financials, other statements on auditing 
procedure cover the responsibilities of the auditor to disclose facts he has dis-
covered pertaining to unaudited statements that make such unaudited state-
ments misleading, particularly in connection with a proxy or prospectus. For ex-
ample SAP 47 (September 1971) at paragraph 23 states ". . . [If the auditor] 
concludes on the basis of facts known to him that the unaudited financial state-
ments [in a registration statement] are not in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles he should insist on appropriate revision; failing that he 
should add a comment in his report calling attention to the departure; further, 
he should consider, probably with advice of legal counsel, withholding his con-
sent to the use of his report on the audited financial statements in the registration 
statement." 
SAP 47 states that an accountant should insist on "appropriate revision." 
It does not specifically state that he should notify the SEC or stockholders. If the 
commissioner prevails in NSM, he will thus expand the responsibilities of the 
auditors. The courts are again urged to take auditing practice a step beyond that 
dictated by the standards currently pronounced by the members of the profession. 
Concluding Remarks 
It may be small comfort—but then at least some—for the accounting profes-
sion in the United States to note that they are not alone in their trial of fire. 
The U K cases of Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. and Hedley Byrne & Co.. 
Ltd. v. Heller and Partners, Ltd. were cited by Mr. Sommer. 
In the December 1971 Abacus, W. P. Birkett and R. B. Walker describe 
major Australian company failures of the past two decades, including the Reid 
Murray group, and discuss the resulting lawsuits. They conclude "Perhaps more 
than any other factor, company failures have tested accountants' claims to pro-
fessional status, their capacity to respond to criticism, the quality of their 
organization and the rationale of their various practices."3 
Nor have our Canadian neighbors been without their cases. In the May 
1971 Canadian Chartered Accountant William A. Farlinger concludes in the 
Atlantic Acceptance Corporation case that although Atlantic's failure resulted in 
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some large losses, those who suffered them were able to afford it.4 On the other 
hand, Atlantic has stimulated better financial information for investors. 
What are the implications of these cases? 
First, it seems highly probable that business for attorneys in the liability 
area will increase throughout the 1970's. 
Second, some major auditing firms will suffer painful consequences, in the 
short run. 
Third, the 1970's lawsuits—like McKesson-Robbins—will result in further 
extensions of auditing practices that will increase the prestige and importance 
of the auditing profession in the long run. 
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